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ABSTRACT
The principle of equitable utilization and the doctrine of equitable 
apportionment are regarded highly in customary international law for the 
apportionment of transboundary river waters between upper and lower 
riparian states. In this regard, the Indus Waters Treaty is an excellent 
example of the pragmatic implementation of the principle of equitable 
utilization, as well as of the principles of equity and justice. The treaty allotted 
three eastern rivers to India and three western rivers to Pakistan in an attempt 
to equitably divide the shared Indus River basin and its five tributaries 
between the neighboring countries. However, India has now expressed an
eagerness to modify the Indus Waters Treaty as it wants to gain a higher 
water share of the western rivers for its hydropower projects. Pakistan has 
not accepted Indian calls to modify the treaty because it considers Indian 
demands for a higher share of the western rivers as inequitable and unjust 
in nature. Furthermore, Pakistan is already receiving an insufficient flow 
of waters in its western rivers and negligible water flow from the eastern
rivers; it cannot forgo more water to India as this could be detrimental to
its agricultural economy.
INTRODUCTION
The principles of equity allocate resources between people equitably 
and justifiably, with the core rationale of upholding justice among humans.1 
In this regard, the allocation and apportionment of transnational river waters
have been a matter of concern among states,2 particularly in the subcontinent
 1. See Dinah Shelton, Equality, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 652, 654 (Daniel Bodansky ed., 2007). 
2. See Peters Rogers, Management of Water Sources, in TREATISE ON WATER
SCIENCE 4 (Peter Wilderer ed., 2011).
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region3 where the upper riparian state of India and the lower riparian state 
of Pakistan share the Indus River basin, which emerges from the Himalayas
and passes through northern India to Pakistan.4 The majority of the population
of Pakistan is directly dependent on the waters of this river basin for agriculture, 
food, and drinking,5 whereas India aims at constructing hydropower
projects in the Indus basin in its territory.6 In this regard, there are some 
principles and theories that regulate the allocation of water between the
upper and lower riparian states, and these principles are applicable for 
water apportionment between Pakistan and India.7 
The first section of this paper sets out the “inequitable” and “equitable” 
water-apportionment frameworks, which were devised to divide transboundary
river waters between two or more states. The inequitable frameworks
disregard the principles of equity and justice, whereas the equitable frameworks 
follow the principles of justice, fairness, and equity in the allocation of
waters between states. The second section of this paper evaluates the 
significance of the Indus Waters Treaty in resolving water-apportionment 
disputes between upper riparian India and lower riparian Pakistan, as well 
as the underlying water-sharing principles of this treaty. The third section
includes the rationale for the modification of the Indus Waters Treaty, the 
respective Indian and Pakistani stances related to the treaty’s modification, 
and the perceived benefits and harms associated with the modification of
the treaty. The idea of needs and wants is addressed in the third section in
relation to the contemporary utilization of river waters by India and Pakistan. 
3. See AMITA BATRA, REGIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN SOUTH ASIA: TRAPPED IN
CONFLICT? 78 (2013). 
4. See MALCOLM COOPER, River Tourism in the South Asian Subcontinent, in RIVER
TOURISM 25–26 (Bruce Prideaux ed., 2009). 
5. See Peter S. Meadows et al., The Indus River and Pakistan’s Economy: Energy, 
Environmental Resources, and Developmental Policy, in TECHNOLOGY AND DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES: PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS,THEORETICAL ISSUES 40 (Richard Heeks ed., 1995); see 
also Adrien Courton, Tackling the Water Crisis in Pakistan: What Entrepreneurial Approaches 
Can Add, in RUNNING ON EMPTY: PAKISTAN’S WATER CRISIS 118 (Michael Kugelman ed., 
2009).
6. See M. Dinesh Kumar et al., Water Scarcity and Pollution in South and Southeast
Asia: Problems and Challenges, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIETY IN
ASIA (Paul Harris & Graeme Lang eds., 2015). 
7.  Robert Speed et al., Basin Water Allocation Planning, UNESCO 24 (2013), http:// 
unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0022/002208/220875e.pdf [https://perma.cc/E98E-DY32]. 
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1. THE DEBATE OVER WATER APPORTIONMENT
With the rapid upsurge in population in the twentieth century, a strain 
on water resources has been felt by almost every nation.8 Technological 
advancement has convinced states to construct dams in order to store massive 
quantities of water to cater for the ever-increasing needs of the general
population for water utilization for irrigation, hydropower generation, and
industrial and domestic purposes.9 This has steered the inequitable distribution 
of water and consequent instigation of conflicts between upper and lower 
riparian countries, particularly when the upper riparian states have used 
major portions of the shared river water for agricultural and hydropower
generation purposes, leaving behind an inadequate flow of waters in the 
shared river basin, which proves insufficient to fulfill the water-related
needs of the lower riparian state.10 
As a result, the international community has proposed a number of
theories and principles for regulating the utilization and distribution of the
rivers that flow across international borders among the upper and lower 
riparian countries. Some individual contributors of international law have 
proposed their own theories for the apportionment of water among states; 
however, only some of these theories have been widely accepted by the 
international community. These have become doctrines and principles of 
water apportionment, owing to their suggested reasonable and equitable 
water-sharing frameworks. On the other hand, some theories for water
apportionment have been rejected and have become obsolete with the 
passage of time owing to their unjustified water-sharing formulas. Section 
1 of this paper sets out the prominent water-sharing theories and doctrines 
of the two categories, which are explained below. 
A. Inequitable Water-Apportionment Frameworks 
As mentioned above, some doctrines have followed inequitable and unjust
water-apportionment formulas because they supported and favored either
the upper riparian or the lower riparian region. Moreover, these frameworks 
ignored the jus cogens of equity and justice. These frameworks are referred
 8. G. TYLER MILLER & SCOTT E. SPOOLMAN, LIVING IN THE ENVIRONMENT: PRINCIPLES,
CONNECTIONS, AND SOLUTIONS 328 (2009). 
9. YU B. MGALOBELOV & YU A. LANDAU, NON-CONVENTIONAL CONSTRUCTION OF
CONCRETE DAM ON ROCK FOUNDATIONS vii (Margaret Majithia ed., Dr. G. Venkatachalan
trans., 1997). 
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to in this paper as “inequitable water-apportionment frameworks.” The 
particular details of these theories are set out below. 
1. Absolute Territorial Sovereignty Theory 
According to the absolute territorial sovereignty theory, every country
has the right to use all of the water resources that pass through its territory. 
Traditionally, this theory has been favored by only the upper riparian states.11 
It was presented by former U.S. Attorney General Judson Harmon in 1895
and is therefore known as the “Harmon Doctrine.”12 The core rationale of 
this theory is that any river that originates from a country, or any portion 
of a river that flows through the territory of that country, is the natural
property of that country and can be considered as analogous to its natural 
resources.13 As a result, it is the legitimate right of that country to use the 
water resource in any proportion and for any purpose it sees fit. Hence,
this theory ensures full legitimate authority to the upper riparian states to 
use or divert all river waters toward their own land for any purpose and to 
completely neglect the water needs of the lower riparian states.14 
Because of this theory’s inequitable and unjust water-apportionment
suggestions, the United States soon withdrew its support of it.15 Furthermore,
some circles of international law also criticized the practicalities of this 
theory for its unjustifiable water-sharing principles.16 As the application 
of this framework allowed the upper riparian state to exploit or block the 
transboundary river water destined to reach to the lower riparian state, it 
can cause significant harm to the lower riparian state by creating a shortage
of water in its river basins. Furthermore, this caused an imbalance in the 
water-sharing between the two riparian states by depriving the lower riparian
state of shared river waters. To avoid such an injustice and discrimination 
11. Stephen C. Lonergan & David B. Brooks, Watershed: The Role of Fresh Water
in the Israeli Palestinian Conflict, INT’L DEV. RESEARCH CTR 168 (1994).
12. DANTE CAPONERA, PRINCIPLES OF WATER LAW AND ADMINISTRATION 216 (Marcella 
Nanni ed., 2d ed. 2007) [hereinafter CAPONERA].
13. AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF SOUTH AFRICA, COOPERATIVE DIPLOMACY, REGIONAL
STABILITY AND NATIONAL INTERESTS: THE NILE RIVER AND RIPARIAN STATES, 41 (Korwa 
G. Adar & Nicasius A. Check eds., 2011). 
14. NAHID ISLAM, THE LAW OF NON-NAVIGATIONAL USES OF INTERNATIONAL
WATERCOURSES 102 (2010). 
15. AARON WOLF & JEROME DELLI PRISCOLI. MANAGING AND TRANSFORMING WATER
CONFLICTS 58 (2010). 
16. See ISLAM, supra note 14, at 105. 
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to the lower riparian state, the “absolute territorial sovereignty theory” was 
never applied for water apportionment between countries.17 Furthermore, it
has never been accepted by the international community18 because it does
not uphold the principles of equity and justice. 
To demonstrate the unjustifiability of this theory, consider the following
scenario: if we attempt to apply it in the South Asian region, where India
is the upper riparian state and Pakistan is the lower riparian state,19 then
India can enjoy surplus waters by exercising autonomy over the rivers it 
shares with Pakistan. Under this theory, India could justify its aggressive
water control through the principle of the exclusive rights of the upper riparian
state, consequently denying any rights of the lower riparian state, Pakistan. 
However, if we apply the same argument to China and India, where 
China is the upper riparian state and India is the lower riparian state, then
this theory will mean that China has exclusive water rights over the rivers
that originate in its territory and reach India. India would not be willing to 
accept the same theory because it does not in fact support justice. This 
creates an inconsistency in the application of this theory when India accepts
it for the apportionment of water with its lower riparian state but rejects it 
for its upper riparian state. This paper argues that a theory should be universal
and aligned with the principles of equity and justice, such that any country
is willing to accept it in any given conflict, whether that is with the lower
riparian state or with the upper riparian state; therefore, owing to India’s
inequitable and unjust approach toward this theory it cannot be implemented
practically. The theory has been criticized by scholars and has never been 
able to take root in international law.20 
2. Territorial Integrity Theory 
The territorial integrity theory contrasts with absolute territorial sovereignty
theory. It was developed by renowned scholars, including Oppenheim, 
Huber, and Fleischman,21 and later included in Article 2(4) of the Charter
of the United Nations, which prevents UN members from engaging in any 
threatening action against another state.22 The theory states that a lower
riparian state has the absolute right to utilize waters that reach its territory
and the upper riparian state cannot decrease or increase the natural flow
 17. See WOLF & PRISCOLI, supra note 15, at 58. 
18. Id.
 19. C.A. BREBBIA, WATER AND SOCIETY II 107 (2013). 
20. KORWA GOMBE ADAR & NICASIUS CHECK, Cooperative Diplomacy, REGIONAL
STABILITY AND NATIONAL INTERESTS 12 (2011) [hereinafter ADAR & CHECK].
21. See ISLAM, supra note 14, at 106–07. 
22. L. ALI KHAN, A THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 61–62 (2006). 
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of such waters.23 It prohibits the upper riparian states from storing or
utilizing excessive water within their own territory for any purpose— 
including agricultural or hydropower purposes—to such a degree that can
cause a shortage of shared river water for the lower riparian state. If the 
diversion or utilization of shared waters is required by the upper riparian
for a beneficial purpose, then the upper riparian state is required to seek
the consent of the lower riparian state.24 
In actuality, this theory endorses the application of international obligations 
on upper riparian states such that they may not perform any transgressions
of their assigned responsibilities related to respecting the rights of lower
riparian states, but it completely disregards any responsibilities of the lower 
riparian states.25 Therefore, this theory makes the lower riparian state a water 
transgressor and hence avoids the equitable and reasonable utilization of 
shared transboundary river waters between the upper and lower riparian
states, which causes the exploitation of the upper riparian state’s fair share 
of water. As this theory overlooks the water rights of the upper riparian
states, it has been denounced not only by upper riparian states but also by
the international community.26 Consequently, this theory was unable to take 
hold in international law, owing to its inequitable preferential treatment
for the lower riparian states and its underlying biased and unjust nature.27 
For instance, a water-sharing dispute emerged between France (the
upper riparian state) and Spain (the lower riparian state) over the usage of 
water of Lake Lanoux and the Carol River in the early nineteenth century.
France wanted to use the water of Lake Lanoux to generate electricity and
therefore it needed to construct a hydropower facility on the Carol River; 
however, Spain protested and maintained that the project could affect the
flow of water in the Carol River, to which Lake Lanoux was connected.28 
Spain applied the territorial integrity theory as a principle of water
apportionment and proposed that France could not initiate the hydropower 
23. FACING GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE: ENVIRONMENTAL, HUMAN, ENERGY,
FOOD, HEALTH AND WATER SECURITY CONCEPTS 657 (Hans Günter Brauch et al., eds., 2009)
[hereinafter Brauch et al.].
24. See ISLAM, supra note 14, at 106–07. 
25. See Melissa Lopez, Border Tensions and the Need for Water: An Application 
of Equitable Principles to Determine Water Allocation from the Rio Grande to the United 
States and Mexico, 9 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 489, 501 (1996-1997). 
26. See Brauch et al., supra note 23, at 657 (detailing the sentiments of the upper
riparian states and the international community towards the territorial integrity theory).
27. Id.
 28. See ISLAM, supra note 14, at 106–07. 
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project without consent from Spain.29 This restricted France from commencing 
the hydropower project for around 40 years,30 until 1957, when the differences 
between the two countries were resolved when the Arbitral Tribunal
rejected territorial integrity theory,31 concluding that the theory did not
serve justice to the upper riparian states. Subsequently, territorial integrity 
theory lost its significance owing to its unreasonable bias toward lower 
riparian states and its apparent neglect of the water-related demands of the 
upper riparian.
The absolute territorial sovereignty and territorial integrity frameworks 
as set out above cannot produce positive results when they are implemented
for water apportionment between upper and lower riparian states. These 
doctrines are not aligned with the principles of equity, justice, and international 
law that advocate the allocation and utilization of shared resources (including 
water resources) equitably and justly without causing harm to other riparian
states. Hence, for a water-apportionment framework to be implemented 
and acceptable to every state, it would have to be based on the principles
of justice and allocate water reasonably and equitably among the riparian 
states, as it is the essential responsibility of the international community
to devise frameworks for resolving transboundary water-sharing disputes 
among states to avert prejudice and discrimination to any riparian state. 
B. Equitable Water-Apportionment Frameworks 
Many of the water-apportionment frameworks provided by the international
law community endorse the “equitable,” “just,” and “reasonable” distribution
of water between upper and lower riparian states. Most of these principles 
are currently followed in different regions of the world for the utilization
and division of shared river basins by upper and lower riparian states. These 
frameworks are detailed below. 
1. Limited Territorial Sovereignty Theory 
The apparent denunciation of the absolute territorial sovereignty and 
territorial integrity theories paved the way for a new principle, termed the 
“limited territorial sovereignty theory.”32 Under this theory, every country
could utilize its water resources and the rivers that pass through its territory 
to reach another country only if such utilization does not harm any other
29.  Nitza Shapiro Libai, Development of International River Basins: Regulation of 
Riparian Competition, 45 IND. L.J. 20, 31 (1969). 
30. Id.
 31. See ISLAM, supra note 14, at 106–07; see also Lake Linux Arbitration (Fr. v.
Spain), 12 R.I.A.A. 281 (Arb. Trib. 1957). 
32. CAPONERA, supra note 12, at 213. 
206
QURESHI (DO NOT DELETE) 5/23/2017 4:24 PM      
 




    
 
 














     
  
 
   
 
    
 
[VOL. 18:  199, 2017] Modifications of the Indus Waters Treaty 
SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J.
riparian country.33 This theory has roots in Roman law, which prohibits 
causing any injury to neighbors in the utilization of property. Therefore, 
this theory is also famously called the “theory of good neighborliness.”34 
Scholars have also used different other names for this theory: the limited
territorial integrity theory, the restricted territorial integrity theory, the 
restricted territorial sovereignty theory, and the qualified territorial sovereignty 
theory.35 All of these refer to the same theory. 
This theory fosters the idea of “equality of rights” and therefore has been
appreciated by a number of international lawmakers.36 It also states that
the allocation of water between the riparian states should be “reasonable” and
“equitable.” As it preserved the principles of equity and justice, this theory 
was adopted for international water laws.37 It was first used and ratified 
by the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) in 1929 in the River 
Oder Commission Case.38 
2. Riparian Rights Doctrine 
The doctrine of riparian rights has its source in English common law 
and has been adopted by the United States for devising a commonly
acceptable formula for sharing water between the upper and lower riparian
states within the U.S.39 This doctrine requires that all riparian states possess
collective ownership of the shared water resources. Furthermore, the riparian 
states are obliged not to cause harm to other riparian states while utilizing
water for any purpose.40 
The riparian rights doctrine employs two techniques for sharing water. 
The first technique involves the “reasonable utilization” of water by each 
riparian state, which means the unlimited utilization of the water of shared 
33. Id.; see also Salman M.A. Salman, The Helsinki Rules, The UN Watercourses 
Convention and the Berlin Rules: Perspectives on International Water Law, 23 WATER
RESOURCES DEV. 625, 627 (2007). 
34. See ISLAM, supra note 14, at 108. 
35. Id.
 36. ADAR & CHECK, supra note 20, at 41; see also ISLAM, supra note 14, at 129. 
37. Muhammad Mizanur Rahaman, Principles of International Water Law: Creating
Effective Transboundary Water Resources Management, INT’L J. OF SUSTAINABLE SOC’Y
207, 210 (2009). 
38. See CAPONERA, supra note 12, at 213. 
39. JOHN BURCH JR., WATER RIGHTS AND THE ENVIRONMENT IN THE UNITED STATES
xiv (2015) [hereinafter BURCH].
40. ANDREW ALBERT DZURIK, WATER RESOURCES PLANNING 26 (2003) [hereinafter 
DZURIK].
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rivers by the upper riparian state, subject to the condition that the usage 
must not deny the lower riparian state from any “reasonable utilization” 
of river water.41 This was proposed by Judge Joseph Story in deciding water 
apportionment in the case of Tyler v. Wilkinson.42 In this regard, this
technique recommends the use of water for the basic needs of life necessary
for human survival, for instance drinking and irrigation, and it does not 
endorse the mass utilization of water for industrial purposes.43 
On the other hand, the second technique involves the idea of “correlative
rights” and suggests a proportional share of water for the upper and lower
riparian states in relation to their respective land areas.44 This idea is also 
applicable to the usage of ground waters by each riparian state.45 Moreover, 
the same notion can be applied for claiming the ownership of a natural 
resource that may be found in the shared territory of two or more riparian
states.
The riparian rights doctrine has pragmatic implications as it assigns 
equitable water shares to each riparian state and suggests the proportional
ownership of land to each riparian state for assigning the ownership of their 
respective shares of water.46 Moreover, the riparian states can also decide
through mutual agreement that they can adopt either the “reasonable
utilization” principle to share water equitably or the “correlative rights” 
principle to share it proportionally, which averts the occurrence of any kind
of injustice and unfairness in the distribution of water resources. Therefore,
this principle, when implemented, can fairly distribute the water of a shared
river basin to the concerned riparian states.47 As the riparian rights doctrine 
presents such a reasonable and justifiable water-apportionment framework, it
is followed in eastern Canada,48 as well as in almost all of the eastern states
of the United States for sharing water among them for reasonable purposes, 
such as domestic, industrial, and agricultural utilization.49 
If we apply this doctrine between two hostile international riparian 
states, for example, India as the upper riparian and Pakistan as the lower 
41. Id.
 42. See BURCH, supra note 39, at xiv. 
43. Id.; see also DZURIK, supra note 40, at 26.
 44. See DZURIK, supra note 40, at 26. 
45. See Lucy Allen & Juliet Christian-Smith, Legal and Institutional Framework of 
Water Management, in A TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY U.S. WATER POLICY 23, 39–42 (2012). 
46. See DZURIK, supra note 40, at 26. 
47. Xuetao Hu, Dissertation: Fair Allocation And Trading Of Surface Water Rights 
Under The Riparian Doctrine, ii–iii (Jan. 6, 2010) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. of
Ill. At Urbana-Champaign) (on file with author). 
48. ISOBEL W. HEATHCOTE, INTEGRATED WATERSHED MANAGEMENT: PRINCIPLES
AND PRACTICE 321 (1998). 
49. MINGTEH CHANG, FOREST HYDROLOGY: AN INTRODUCTION TO WATER AND FORESTS
118 (3d ed. 2012). 
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riparian state, then each would need to respect the rights of the other for 
equitably utilizing their shared rivers. If India adopts the “reasonable
utilization” condition of this doctrine, then it would have the essential duty
not to cause any harm to Pakistan, whether by obstructing water flow in 
its rivers or by inundating its river basins. Furthermore, it would have to 
reevaluate its water-storage and hydropower projects over the western rivers 
so that they not affect the natural flow of water in the western river basins,
which were originally allocated to Pakistan by the Indus Waters Treaty.
On the other hand, if India chooses to adopt the “correlative rights” 
condition, then this would necessitate that Pakistan be given the major
share of the western rivers because most of the area of the western river
basins is located in Pakistan. Both countries would need to hold dialogues 
for deciding upon the equitable, just, and reasonable proportions of water
from each river basin to be used according to the “reasonable utilization” 
or “correlative rights” principle. 
3. Prior Appropriation Doctrine 
The prior appropriation principle assigns the ownership of a shared water
resource to the region that uses the water resource first. This doctrine is 
also called “prior in time, prior in right.”50 The time factor is crucial to 
allocating ownership of the resource of water because the one who uses
water first will be considered the owner of that water resource.51 The first 
user is called the “senior appropriator” and the second user is the “junior 
appropriator” by this principle.52 
This theory gives the legitimate and justified right to the senior appropriator 
for using the water and diverting its course as per its needs.53 The Junior
Appropriator cannot steal the rightful and reasonable water share of the 
senior appropriator. However, according to this principle, it is also mandatory
that the senior appropriator use or divert river water only for beneficial 
purposes and that its actions not cause any harm to the junior appropriator. 
Subsequently, the junior appropriator can use the remaining portion of
water for reasonable purposes. Hence, the principle assigns superior ownership
 50. WATER AND SUSTAINABILITY IN ARID REGIONS 224 (Graciela Schneier-Madanes &
Marie-Francoise Courel eds., 2009) [hereinafter Schneier-Madanes & Courel].
51. GABY NEUNZERT, SUBDIVIDING THE LAND: METES AND BOUNDS AND RECTANGULAR
SURVEY SYSTEMS 113 (2010) [hereinafter NEUNZERT].
52. See DZURIK, supra note 40, at 27. 
53. See Schneier-Madanes & Courel, supra note 50, at 224. 
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of water to the senior appropriator only for beneficial use; thus, it prevents 
any harmful diversion of water.54 This stands in accordance with the
theory of good neighborliness, which prohibits causing any harm to the
neighbor state, along with the principles of morality and “equity theory,” 
which specifically supports the upholding of justice in the division of shared
resources. Owing to such attributes, this principle has also been incorporated
into the 1966 Helsinki Rules,55 which were honored until 2004, when they
were modified and replaced by the “Berlin Rules.”56 
Originally, the prior appropriation rule was devised in the United States
in the first half of the nineteenth century, when gold miners were digging 
for gold in California, resulting in the diversion of streams of the Colorado 
River to the western states of the United States.57 With the emergence of 
the prior appropriation doctrine, it was mandated that the prior user of the 
river water had the right to use the water unrestrictedly for reasonable 
purposes as well as to divert the water for beneficial pursuits.58 Ultimately, 
this rule endorsed the utilization and diversion of Colorado River water 
by the miners in California as legitimate, because they were diverting 
water for beneficial purposes. At present, this doctrine is still followed in 
nine states in the U.S.—Wyoming, New Mexico, Colorado, Arizona, 
Alaska, Idaho, Utah, Montana, and Nevada59—due to its justified pragmatism
and reasonableness in allocating the ownership of water among states.
In addition to the implementation of this principle among states within
a country, this principle can be justifiably applied for equitably and
reasonably distributing water resources between two or more international 
states, i.e., upper and lower riparian countries. Let us again consider the 
example of upper riparian India and lower riparian Pakistan. In this example,
Pakistan has since 1960 been allotted the exclusive ownership right to consume 
waters of its western rivers by the Indus Waters Treaty for the equitable
apportionment of shared river basins between India and Pakistan. Therefore,
as per the prior appropriation rule, Pakistan became the senior appropriator for
the western rivers and India the junior appropriator in an equitable and
justified response to Pakistan’s role of a junior appropriator for the eastern
rivers, over which India became the senior appropriator in 1960. In this 
54. See NEUNZERT, supra note 51, at 113. 
55. KISHOR UPRETY & SALMAN M.A. SALMAN, CONFLICT AND COOPERATION ON
SOUTH ASIA’S INTERNATIONAL RIVERS xviii (2002) [hereinafter UPRETY & SALMAN]; see
also KAI WEGERICH ET AL., WATER AND SECURITY IN CENTRAL ASIA: SOLVING A RUBIK’S 
CUBE 104 (2016). 
56. SUSTAINABILITY OF INTEGRATED WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT 449 (Maria
Concepcion Donoso & Shimelis Gebriye Setegn eds., 2015). 
57. Denise Fort, Prior Appropriation, in WATER ENCYCLOPEDIA (2017).
58. See DZURIK, supra note 40, at 27. 
59. GRENETTA THOMASSEY & ZACHARY ALDEN SMITH, FRESHWATER ISSUES 22 (2002). 
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regard, the junior appropriators were not allowed consumptive usage, i.e.,
the diversion of each other’s rivers.60 This distribution was precisely equitable 
and reasonable in its approach; it was based on the principles of equity
because there were three rivers allocated to each country: the three eastern
rivers were allocated to India and the three western rivers to Pakistan.61 
As a further practical illustration of this theory, the Indian construction 
works of massive water-storage dams on the western rivers basins that fall
within its territory are appropriate to discuss here. For instance, India’s 
Kishanganga dam has the capability to cause diversion in the flow of a 
tributary of the Indus basin, the Neelum River, where it meets with the Pakistani 
Jhelum River in Indian-held Kashmir’s Baramula District.62 Originally, 
the Neelum River met with the Jhelum River in Pakistani territory, in 
Muzaffarabad.63 As per the prior appropriation principle, Pakistan uses the
Neelum and Jhelum Rivers as a senior appropriator and India is the junior
appropriator.64 The IWT also endorses the prior appropriation rule as its 
Annexure D includes this paragraph: 
[W]here a Plant is located on a Tributary of The Jhelum on which Pakistan has
any Agricultural Use or hydro-electric use, the water released below the Plant
may be delivered, if necessary, into another Tributary but only to the extent that
the then existing Agricultural Use or hydro-electric use by Pakistan on the former
Tributary would not be adversely affected.65 
Therefore, as per the abovementioned point of the IWT and as according 
to the prior appropriation doctrine, India cannot divert the Neelum–Jhelum 
River in such a way that may cause harm to the natural flow of the tributary 
of the river in Pakistan.66 If India does otherwise, it will stand as a violator
of the bilateral Indus Waters Treaty, the prior appropriation principle, and 
the equity principle. 
In this regard, it is pertinent to mention that the prior appropriation rule, 
for a specific water resource or river basin, is not biased toward any one
riparian side; rather, it allocates ownership of the water resource to the
rightful owner of that specific water resource based on the first reasonable
 60. See Indus Waters Treaty, India-Pak., art. II–IV, Sept. 19, 1960, 419 U.N.T.S. 
61. Id.
 62. Kishanganga Dam—Another Set of Failed Water Talks, DAWN (Dec. 5, 2005,
12:00 AM), https://www.dawn.com/news/168442 [https://perma.cc/G98N-DG9G]. 
63. Id.
 64. See generally Schneier-Madanes & Courel, supra note 50, at 224. 
65. See Indus Waters Treaty, supra note 60, Annexure D, part 16-III. 
66. AK CHATURVEDI, WATER: A SOURCE FOR FUTURE CONFLICTS 170 (2013). 
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utilization of that resource.67 The rightful owner of a resource should be
allowed to exercise full control over its legal possession. In the aforementioned 
example, Pakistan is the rightful owner of the western rivers according to 
the 1960s Indus Waters Treaty68 and, therefore, only Pakistan can divert 
the course of the western rivers. Moreover, Pakistani regions were also
unrestrictedly utilizing western river waters prior to the partition69 and 
before the construction of Indian mass storage facilities on these rivers;70 
therefore, Pakistani regions can claim ownership of the western river waters 
on the basis of the prior appropriation rule even in the absence of the Indus 
Waters Treaty.
4. The Unity of River Basin Principle 
Another principle that echoes in international law is “the unity of the 
river basin principle,” which was first coined in the International Law
Association’s Conference in 1958.71 The acceptance of this principle
invalidates the inequitable water-apportionment frameworks, i.e., the territorial 
sovereignty and territorial integrity theories, as it supports an unbiased and
equitable distribution of water between upper and lower riparian states for
the benefits of both.72 According to this principle, “[a] system of rivers 
and lakes in a drainage basin should be treated as an integrated whole.”73 
This principle suggests that a river basin that is shared by two or more
states should be considered as a single river basin.74 Because of the unity 
of the river basin, neither state can claim absolute ownership of the entire
river basin. Therefore, the river basin area should be regarded as a shared 
territory between the states. This implies that states would be required to
share the water of the river basin, but no state is allowed to exploit the 
water share of the other state. To uphold the principles of justice and equity, 
the states can equitably share water with each other.75
 67. See Schneier-Madanes & Courel, supra note 50, at 224. 
68. See BRAHMA CHELLANEY, WATER: ASIA’S NEW BATTLEGROUND 77 (2013). 
69. GWYNNE DYER, CLIMATE WARS: THE FIGHT FOR SURVIVAL AS THE WORLD
OVERHEATS 40–50 (reprint 2011). 
70. MATTHEW ZENTNER, DESIGN AND IMPACT OF WATER TREATIES: MANAGING CLIMATE 
CHANGE 136–41 (2012). 
71. LUDWIK TECLAFF, THE RIVER BASIN IN HISTORY AND LAW 154 (Albert H. Garretson 
ed., 1967).
72.  Raj Krishna & Salman M. A. Salman, International Groundwater Law and the 
World Bank Police for Projects on Transboundary Groundwater, in GROUNDWATER: LEGAL 
AND POLICY PERSPECTIVES 163, 177 (Salman M.A. Salman ed., 1999) [hereinafter Krishna 
& Salman].
73. OWENMCINTYRE,ENVIRONMENTALPROTECTION OF INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 42 (reprint 2016) [hereinafter MCINTYRE].
74. See Libai, supra note 29, at 32–34. 
75. Id. at 33–34; see Krishna & Salman, supra note 72, at 177. 
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This principle also recommends the development and upgrading of the 
shared river basins to cater sustainably for the water-related needs of both 
riparian states;76 however, it does not provide the exact and pragmatic
mechanism for this purpose.77 Unfortunately, the political rivalry among 
the riparian states may not facilitate the implementation of this principle 
effectively because a rival state may not be willing to coordinate with 
another rival state for the equitable distribution of shared river waters. 
However, the principle of equitable apportionment eradicates these limitations 
and recommends the justified and reasonable allocation of waters of the
shared river basin,78 which is discussed at the end of this section. 
The unity of the river basin principle can be applied to the Indus basin,
shared between India and Pakistan. Both countries have set up a treaty,
the Indus Waters Treaty, for equitably and justly sharing the water of the 
Indus basin between them in accordance with the principles of equity and 
justice. Moreover, both countries regard the systems of streams, lakes, and
rivers related to the Indus basin as part of a single basin. Therefore, as per 
the unity of the river basin principle, neither India nor Pakistan can claim 
full authority over the Indus River basin. The basin will remain shared
territory between the two states and the upper riparian state—i.e., India— 
may not block the water of this river basin from flowing to the lower 
riparian state—Pakistan—as the occurrence of such an event is not only
against this principle, but also against the principles of equity and justice.
5. The Helsinki Rules and the Berlin Rules on Water Courses
The International Law Association proposed the Helsinki Rules in 1966 
in Helsinki, Finland. These rules were aimed at creating a framework for 
the equitable and reasonable allocation of transboundary river waters.79 
For this purpose, these rules evaluated different factors such as climate,
hydrology, geography, water utilization, socioeconomic aspects of river 
basins, and the water-related needs of the population dependent on the
 76. E.M. Mokuoane, Revised Protocol on Shared Watercourses in the Southern
African Development Community, in  INTERSECTORAL MANAGEMENT ON RIVER BASINS
343, 349 (Charles Abernethy ed., 2001). 
77. See Libai, supra note 29, at 34. 
 78. William Olcott, Equitable Apportionment: A Judicial Bridge over Troubled Waters, 
6 NEBRASKA L. REV. 734, 734–45 (1987) [hereinafter Olcott]. 
79. ASIT BISWAS ET AL., MANAGEMENT OF TRANSBOUNDARY RIVERS AND LAKES
128 (2008) [hereinafter BISWAS ET AL.].
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shared river basins.80 The Helsinki Rules endorsed the utilization of the
river water only for reasonable purposes and nonnavigational usages.81 
Although the Helsinki Rules contained express suggestions for the equitable 
apportionment of water among countries owning one or more transborder 
shared river basins,82 they could not offer an exact framework for the
implementation of a common formula that would sustainably apportion
water between the upper and lower riparian states and be acceptable to both 
for sharing one or more river basins.83 Because of the neglect of sustainability
and other factors, the International Law Association modified the Helsinki 
Rules in 2004 and replaced them with the new Berlin Rules on Water
Courses at the Berlin Conference on Water Resources.84 The Berlin Rules
included some elements of the Helsinki Rules but supplemented more
exactness to them; moreover, these rules also incorporated the fundamentals 
of the Bonn Declaration 2001, the Johannesburg Declaration 2002, the 
New Delhi Declaration 2002, and the Rio Declaration 1992, which highlighted
the importance of sustainable development.85 
The Berlin Rules are the guiding principles for the equitable allocation 
and sustainable use of the international transboundary rivers and domestic 
water resources, including ground water reserves.86 Furthermore, these 
rules, in a similar way to the Helsinki Rules, advise all international states
to avoid invoking any injury to another state, particularly the states that
share a transboundary river basin.87 Furthermore, in the events of armed 
conflicts and wars, the Berlin Rules also prohibit states from destroying any 
facility for storing water, such as dams and barrages that are located in the
country with which they are at war.88 
Furthermore, as per Article 3 of the Berlin Rules, the protection of the 
natural environment is obligatory on all states, and governments must adopt 
necessary measures to counter any threats, including floods, droughts, and
water shortages, to the ecosystem.89 This obligation also necessitates cooperation 
among states to protect the natural environment, fauna, and flora, and to 
80. WOLF & PRISCOLI, supra note 15, at 55. 
81. See BISWAS ET AL., supra note 79, at 128. 
82. U.N. DEP’T OF ECON. COMM. FOR EUR., RIVER BASIN COMMISSIONS AND OTHER
INSTITUTIONS FOR TRANSBOUNDARY WATER COOPERATION, at 7, U.N. Sales No. E.09.II.E.16
(2009).
83. See BISWAS ET AL., supra note 79, at 128.
 84. BRAHMA CHELLANEY, WATER, PEACE, AND WAR: CONFRONTING THE GLOBAL
WATER CRISIS 350 (2013). 
85.  Alan Boyle et al., Berlin Conference 2004 – Water Resources Law, 4 International 
Law Association 12 (2004) [hereinafter Boyle et al.]. 
86. See BISWAS ET AL., supra note 79, at 128. 
87. LEO SANTBERGEN, AMBIGUOUS AMBITIONS IN THE MEUSE THEATRE 38–39 (2013). 
88. See Boyle et al., supra note 85, art. 50–55, at 43–45.
 89. Id. at 9–12. 
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devise proper strategies to measure and prevent any threats related to their
survival.90 
The Berlin Rules propose water apportionment to the states in a manner 
that obliges states to give priority to the allocation and utilization of water 
for basic human needs.91 This implies that the utilization of water by the
common population for drinking and irrigation are of higher importance 
than water utilization for any other purpose.92 The same rule is applicable 
to the allocation of transboundary river waters shared by two or more 
states. That is, states must ensure that any allocation of their shared river 
waters by either side must not compromise the basic necessities of life of 
the general population.93 The implementation and universal acceptance of 
this rule can ensure a justifiable apportionment of shared waters between 
states, because once the survival of the population is ensured through the
fulfillment of the basic needs of life related to water utilization, then states 
can move on to allocating and utilizing water for other developmental
purposes. 
The aforementioned applicability of the Berlin Rules can also be related 
to the Indus basin’s water utilization by India and Pakistan. As per the 
Berlin Rules, both states are required to give preference to the allocation 
of shared river water for satisfying basic human necessities, and once these
necessities are fulfilled on both sides of the border the water can be justifiably 
utilized for hydropower and other projects.94 In this regard, more responsibility
naturally falls on the upper riparian state, India, because river water comes 
from this region and flows to the lower riparian country, Pakistan.95 Therefore, 
any obstruction of water from the Indian side to Pakistan will eventually
deny water to people in Pakistan.96 
It is also to be noted here that Pakistan allocates a significant share of 
river water for irrigating crops, which is necessary for the production of 
90. Id.
 91. DAWN A. RUSSELL AND DAVID L. VANDERZWAAG, RECASTING TRANSBOUNDARY 
FISHERIES MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS IN LIGHT OF SUSTAINABILITY PRINCIPLES: CANADIAN
AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 506 (2010); see also TAKELE SOBOKA BULTO, THE
EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF THE HUMAN RIGHT TO WATER IN AFRICA 206 (2013). 
92. Id. 
93. See Boyle et al., supra note 85, art. 14, at 21–22. 
94. Id. 
95. ROBERT G. WIRSING & ZAFAR ADEEL, IMAGINING INDUSTAN: OVERCOMING WATER 
INSECURITY IN THE INDUS BASIN 42 (2016) [hereinafter WIRSING & ADEEL].
96. See ANDREW GUZMAN, OVERHEATED: THE HUMAN COST OF CLIMATE CHANGE
(2013). 
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food for its population.97 However, over the last two decades, India has been 
initiating several mass water-storage projects for hydropower generation
by utilizing the waters of the Pakistani rivers within Indian territory.98 
These water-storage projects have generated a threat to the survival of the 
vast agrarian community in Pakistan,99 because the storage of a substantial 
amount of water by the Indian dams has the potential to cause a significant 
shortage of water in Pakistani river basins.100 To highlight the issue, Pakistan
has also raised objections to recent Indian water-storage facilities, such as 
the Kishanganga and Baglehar Dams, the Wullar Barrage, and some other
projects capable of storing substantial quantities of Pakistani western river 
waters, which can eventually result in shortage of water in the western
rivers within Pakistan.101 
In pursuance of the Berlin Rules, India is required to consider the utilization 
of water for agricultural and domestic needs by the Pakistani rural community
as of higher importance than its own mass water-storage projects of
hydropower generation.102 For this purpose, India either needs to halt the
construction of its dams, which are harmful in terms of blocking adequate 
water supply to Pakistan, or it needs to change the design and water-allocation 
capacities of these dams so that their functionality would not cause water
shortage in Pakistan. This will uphold justice and the spirit of the Berlin Rules 
in the region. Furthermore, it will ensure an equitable apportionment and 
utilization of water if India allocates water to its hydropower projects after 
ensuring that Pakistan has received a substantial amount of water for its 
agrarian community. 
97. See  CHRISTOPHER JASPARRO ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT OVER WATER
RESOURCES IN HIMALAYAN ASIA 58 (2012).
98. Matthew Zentner, Design and Impact of Water Treaties: Managing Climate Change
140 (2011); see also Narottam P. Banskota, South Asia Trade and Energy Security: The
Role of India 80–81 (2012). 
99. Naeem Shehzad, Averting a Water War through Surface Water Management in 
Pakistan, 140 PROCEEDINGS OF THE PAKISTAN ACADEMY OFSCIENCES:B.LIFE AND ENVIRONMENTAL
SCIENCES 53(3): 139–48 (2016) [hereinafter Shehzad].
100. Id. at 144. 
101. Pia Malhotra, Another Baglihar in Making, EPILOGUE, July 2010, Vol. 4, Iss. 7,
at 10–11. 
102. As mentioned earlier, Article 14 of the Berlin Rules places stress on states to
prioritize the allocation of water for fulfilling the basic human needs of not only their
population, but also of their neighboring countries; therefore, India needs to follow this 
principle by giving importance to the basic human needs related to water for its own 
population and for the population of its lower riparian international state, Pakistan, instead 
of making hydro-power water storage capacities, which are secondary in their importance. 
For details about Berlin rules, see Boyle et al., supra note 85, art. 14, at 21–22.
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6. Equitable Apportionment and Utilization 
The concept of equitable apportionment recommends an equitable, 
reasonable, and justified water apportionment between two or more states 
based on equality,103 justice, and equity, and endorses an equitable and 
just allocation of resources.104 In the United States, the courts recognize
this principle as the equitable apportionment doctrine.105 Its origin dates
back to the 1902 U.S. Supreme Court ruling in the Kansas v. Colorado case 
for the apportionment of shared river waters between Kansas and Colorado.106 
Subsequently, similar rulings based on the equitable apportionment of
shared waters were issued by U.S. courts in Missouri v. Illinois, Nebraska 
v. Wyoming, and Connecticut v. Massachusetts, which led to the popularity
of this doctrine.107 
On the other hand, the concept of equitable utilization emerged from the
equitable utilization theory, which necessitates an equitable and reasonable 
utilization of shared water resources based on equality of rights.108 This
originated from the Helsinki Rules and is sometimes used interchangeably
with the aforementioned equitable apportionment concept.109 In this section, 
we will discuss both the equitable apportionment and equitable utilization
concepts together for endorsing an equitable allocation and utilization of 
shared river waters. Both concepts, especially equitable utilization, are
recognized as universally acclaimed principles of customary international 
law for the sharing of water among riparian states.110 Furthermore, equitable 
utilization has also been endorsed in the Berlin Rules 2004 and is regarded 
103. BABU RAM CHAUHAN, SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL AND INTERSTATE WATER
DISPUTES IN INDIA 31 (1992) [hereinafter CHAUHAN].
104. J.E. ROECKELEIN, ELSEVIER’S DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORIES 195 (2006)
[hereinafter ROECKELEIN].
105. RADHA D’SOUZA, INTERSTATE DISPUTES OVER KRISHNA WATERS: LAW, SCIENCE
AND IMPERIALISM 471 (2006).
106. JOHN E. MOERLINS ET AL., TRANSBOUNDARY WATER RESOURCES: A FOUNDATION 
FOR REGIONAL STABILITY IN CENTRAL ASIA 214 (2007).
107. See Olcott, supra note 78, at 737–40. 
108. GEBRE TSADIK DEGEFU, THE NILE: HISTORICAL, LEGAL AND DEVELOPMENTAL 
PERSPECTIVES 80 (2003) [hereinafter DEGEFU].
109. See  JÁNOS BRUHÁCS, THE LAW OF NON-NAVIGATIONAL USES OF INTERNATIONAL
WATERCOURSES 157 (1993); see also  CHELIKANI VENKATA VERMA ET AL., CONFERENCE
ON WATER RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT—FLOOD CONTROL, IRRIGATION, WATERWAYS,
ELECTRIC POWER AND ITS EVACUATION: PROCEEDINGS 16 (2002).
110. ANTON EARLE, TRANSBOUNDARY WATER MANAGEMENT: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE
66 (2013) [hereinafter EARLE].
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by the United Nations as the main guiding principle for international 
watercourses.111 
The theoretical basis of this principle rests upon the notion of equality 
of rights,112 which is a central feature of the constitutions of Pakistan, India,
and the United States, and is recognized universally in the constitutions 
of other nations.113 Equality of rights is also a core element of international 
law, which favors the idea of equality of rights at the individual as well as
at the state level. This principle requires states to apply the notion of equality
of rights for allocating shared waters for mutual benefit of states, irrespective 
of their riparian orientation.114 It completely rejects the territorial supremacy
principle, i.e., territorial sovereignty theory, and supports some aspects of
limited or restricted territorial sovereignty theory.115 While favoring the
principles of equity, justice, and the impartial allocation of waters among
riparian states, it proscribes any exploitative utilization or diversion of shared
water by the upper riparian state stirred by political rivalry or any conflicts 
between the riparian states.116 
In this regard, the equitable apportionment principle also describes a 
technical approach for the development and upgrading of a unified river
basin. The essential goal of this approach is the welfare of the whole region, 
without any particular preference being given to any riparian state.117 The
positive aspect of this approach is that it aims to achieve benefits for each
riparian state to finalize the arrangements of the apportionment of water,
and this symbiosis induces the riparian states to cooperate with each other 
to devise mechanism and strategy to equitably distribute their shared river 
water.118 Hence, it necessitates the cooperation between upper and lower
riparian states and suggests exchanging information between them for planning
and allocating “equitable” and “reasonable” shares of water between them.119 
For this purpose, mediation or dialogues between riparian states can also 
play a vital role in establishing cooperation between them for the successful 
and pragmatic implementation of this approach. 
111. MCINTYRE, supra note 73, at 27. 
112. See CHAUHAN, supra note 103, at 31. 
113. IMTIAZ OMAR, EMERGENCY POWERS AND THE COURTS IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN 4 
(2002).
114. See SLAVKO BOGDANOVIĆ, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF WATER RESOURCES 7, 11
(Patricia Wouters & Sergui Vinogradov eds., 2001). 
115. Joseph Dellapenna, The Customary International Law of Transboundary Fresh 
Waters, 1 INT’L J. OF GLOBAL ENVTL. ISSUES 264, 269–70 (2001) [hereinafter Dellapenna].
116. See Libai, supra note 29, at 37. 
117. Id. 
118. See id.
 119. INES DOMBROWSKY, CONFLICT, COOPERATION AND INSTITUTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL
WATER MANAGEMENT 74–75 (2007). 
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The equitable apportionment doctrine also suggests an international 
legal approach that strictly incorporates and applies international law and 
its contemporary implications for constructing a pragmatic framework for
equitable water apportionment between the riparian states.120 The legal
approach necessitates the allocation of reasonable shares to each riparian 
state.121 The core focus resides upon ensuring mutual benefits for both
riparian states and rejecting any unilateral exploitation of shared water 
resources.122 This approach has also been endorsed by the International 
Law Association, which stated the equitable principle for reasonable water 
apportionment between the upper and lower riparian states in these words:
Except as otherwise provided by treaty or other instruments or customs binding
upon the parties, each co-riparian state is entitled to a reasonable and equitable 
share in the beneficial uses of the waters of the drainage basins.123 
The extent to which equitable sharing can be decided by mutual agreement
among the states can be determined by holding dialogues and meetings of 
public officials, who may decide upon a common formula for the equitable 
and reasonable sharing of water. Furthermore, each state can also approach a
third party to devise a framework for the equitable allocation and utilization 
of shared water that would be acceptable to both states. In this regard, the 
Salzburg Session, organized by the French Institute of International Law 
in 1961,124 endorsed a restrictive right for each riparian state to use the shared
river waters in a regulated manner to prevent any likelihood of unilateral 
control of the shared river waters that may result in depriving the neighboring
riparian state.125 
If both states approach a third party to plan and adjudicate the equitable
portion of each state of the shared river waters, then the third party must take
into consideration the overall relevant settings of the shared river basin
and must also analyze the use of the river basin by both states in historic
and contemporary times.  It should then compare these factors with the
 120. 
121. 
See Libai, supra note 29, at 38–39. 
Id.
 122. Id. 
123. Cecil J. Olmstead, The Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International 
Rivers, in INTERNATIONAL LAW OF WATER RESOURCES, CONTRIBUTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL
LAW ASSOCIATION 89, 91 (Slavko Bogdanović ed., 2001). 
124.  Institut de Droit International (IDI). 
125. Charles B. Bourne, The Development of International Water Resources: The 
‘Drainage Basin Approach’, in INTERNATIONAL WATER LAW, SELECTED WRITINGS OF 
PROFESSOR CHARLES B. BOURNE 3, 9 (Patricia Wouters ed., 1997). 
 219
































socioeconomic requirements of both states to decide upon an equitable
share of each riparian state justifiably, pragmatically, and reasonably. The 
third party should also take into account the likelihood of any conflicts 
related to the planned apportionment and perceived utilization of water or 
any other conflict related to regional geopolitical issues.126 The third party 
should take countermeasures to prevent the occurrence of any conflicts 
that could thwart the equitable apportionment frameworks and rules between 
the two states, either now or in the future. These considerations were also
highlighted by the International Law Association during the proceedings
of the Helsinki Conference in 1966–67 and were included in Article 6 of
the Helsinki Rules.127 
In the event of any disagreements or bilateral disputes between the states, 
the Salzburg Session in 1961 presented effective recommendations to the 
states for resolving bilateral or international disputes in pursuance of the
principles of equitable utilization and apportionment.128 It suggested that 
the states must agree to methods of settling disputes by devising a mechanism 
for conciliation through a commission or by making a third party a mediator
for resolving the dispute.129 Subsequently, the conciliation would pave the
way for the apportionment of water based on the principles of justice and
equity, assigning an equal share of resources to each side.130 This divides 
the river waters in an equitable proportion as per the needs of the population 
of each side and also considers the geographical factors on both sides, while
also conciliating the bilateral disputes. 
If we attempt to apply the aforementioned implications of the equitable 
principle to India and Pakistan, then it should be noted that the Indus Waters 
Treaty has already apportioned the shared river waters equitably to both 
states in 1960.131  The Indus Waters Treaty apportioned the river waters
equitably because the three eastern rivers were given to India while the
three western rivers were allocated to Pakistan, despite the hostile mutual
relations of both states throughout their history.132 It is the finest example
of the pragmatic implementation of the equitable apportionment and equitable 
utilization concepts. 
126. See Dellapenna, supra note 115, at 286–87. 
127. Id. at 286. 
128. See Libai, supra note 29, at 38–39. 
129. See Institut de Droit International [IDI] [Institute of International Law] Sessions 
of Salzburg – 1961, International Conciliation, http://www.justitiaetpace.org/idiE/resolutionsE/
1961_salz_02_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/2A9Q-JDDG] (Austria) (explaining in more detail
the suggestions of the session). 
130. See ROECKELEIN, supra note 104, at 195. 
131. WIRSING & ADEEL, supra note 95, at 42. 
132. Id.
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II. THE INDUS WATERS TREATY AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE
The Indus Waters Treaty, signed in 1960, proved to be a landmark in
resolving the water conflict between India and Pakistan. The treaty acted
as a principal formula of water apportionment between the two states and,
to a great extent, resolved the water conflict between them.133 Before this
treaty, the main contention between the two countries was the use of the 
waters of the six shared rivers, which flowed from India to the Pakistani 
province of Punjab and were part of a common Indus River basin.134 
These rivers irrigated major crops that were vital for the economic and 
food sustenance of Pakistan.135 Pakistan adopted the stance that the major
portion of the Indus basin—which includes the streams of five other shared
rivers, the Sutlej, Beas, Ravi, Chenab, and Jhelum Rivers—is situated in 
Pakistani territory and, therefore, Pakistan has the natural right to use the
water from the Indus basin and its connected river streams.136 However, 
on the other hand, India exercised larger control over these rivers owing to its
upper riparian position,137 and it wanted the sole right of ownership over the
waters of these rivers based on the territorial supremacy principle.138 
Overriding the implications of the territorial supremacy and territorial 
integrity principles, which were used by both riparian countries, the Indus 
Waters Treaty allocated the water of the Indus basin on the basis of the principle
of equity in a very reasonable and equitable manner that appealed to both
states.139 In this regard, the World Bank played the role of a mediator between 
India and Pakistan and its efforts were highly regarded in brokering the 
IWT and in finalizing the equitable and reasonable water-sharing framework 
in it.140 Since then, the treaty has stood as the sole guide and standard for the 
sharing of river waters between the states.
 133. UPRETY & SALMAN, supra note 55, at 57. 
134. Id., at 41–43; see also Arnold P. Kaminsky and Roger D. Long, Ph.D., India 
Today: An Encyclopedia of Life in The Republic 734 (2011). 
135. See WIRSING & ADEEL, supra note 95, at 42. 
136. V.P. MALHOTRA, SECURITY AND DEFENCE RELATED TREATIES OF INDIA 273 
(2010) [hereinafter MALHOTRA].
137. See WIRSING & ADEEL, supra note 95, at 42. 
138. The absolute territorial supremacy principle is another term for the absolute 
territorial sovereignty theory. See discussion supra Part I.A.1; VANDANA SHIVA, WATER
WARS: PRIVATIZATION, POLLUTION AND PROFIT 77 (2002).
139. IBRAHIM KAYA, EQUITABLE UTILIZATION: THE LAW OF NON-NAVIGATIONAL USES 
OF INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES 75–76 (2003) [hereinafter KAYA].
140. DHIRENDRAVAIPEYI, WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT:ACOMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
9 (1998). 
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A. IWT Rules of River Waters Apportionment 
The IWT allocated the western rivers, the Chenab, Indus, and Jhelum
Rivers, to Pakistan, while the eastern rivers, the Beas, Ravi, and Sutlej Rivers, 
were given to India.141 Both countries were allowed the unrestricted use 
of their allocated river waters; however, both were also given the right to 
the restricted use of water of the other’s allotted rivers for the following 
purposes:142 
1.	 domestic usage, which includes water for drinking, 
sanitation, etc.,
2.	 agricultural usage, which implies irrigating crops, 
3.	 nonconsumptive use, which includes fishing, navigating,
wildlife, or any other usage in such a manner that does
not cause a substantial shrinkage in the flow of water that
reaches the other riparian state, and 
4.	 hydropower production, which means the generation of 
electricity for the local population; however, this production
is restricted by certain conditions, illustrated below. 
B. Conditions on Use 
Certain conditions were applied on each country for the utilization of 
water of the three rivers allocated to the other country. The first condition 
was that the usage must not harm the natural flow of the river.143 This
means that India, which is an upper riparian state, can create water-storage 
dams or barrages for agricultural usage or hydroelectricity generation by
using the river waters of Pakistani rivers; however, these dams, barrages, 
and hydropower projects must not interrupt the natural flow of the western
rivers. Any consumptive use or diversion of water that may result in a 
decline or a substantial increase in the natural flow of the western rivers
is recognized as a direct violation of Article IV of the Indus Waters Treaty.144 
C. Dispute Resolution Mechanism Enshrined in the IWT 
Article IX of the IWT is related to dispute resolution and proposes a 
three-step process for resolving disagreements related to water utilization
of either a trivial or bitter nature. The first step is the Permanent Indus 




See UPRETY & SALMAN, supra note 55, at 57. 
See Indus Waters Treaty, supra note 60, art. 3.
See id. arts. 2, 4. 
144. See id. art. 4. 
222
QURESHI (DO NOT DELETE) 5/23/2017 4:24 PM      
 
























    
 
  
[VOL. 18:  199, 2017] Modifications of the Indus Waters Treaty 
SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J.
representatives of both countries collaborate to find a solution acceptable
to both states.145 The second step is a neutral expert. If the countries are
unable to resolve their differences, the World Bank can appoint a neutral 
expert, who will hear the concerns of both states. In this regard, the decision 
of the neutral expert would be considered binding on both states.146 The
third step is the Court of Arbitration. If neither the Indus Commission nor 
the neutral expert is able to resolve the disagreements, then the World Bank 
facilitates by establishing a Court of Arbitration upon request from both 
countries. The Court determines the conflict after hearing the case from 
both sides and gives a final verdict that is binding on both states.147 
III. MODIFICATION OF THE IWT 
Despite the fact that the Indus Waters Treaty has equitably and reasonably 
distributed the shared rivers between India and Pakistan,148 India wants to
modify it to gain a higher allocation of the waters of the western rivers, 
allocated to Pakistan.149 Nonetheless, it is also important to consider that
such a modification in the treaty would only be acceptable where it could
be crafted in accordance with international law and the principles of equity
and justice. In this context, the principle of equitable utilization, as explained 
at the end of the first section, is well esteemed by the International Law
Association in customary international law for equitably apportioning water 
between two or more states.150 Therefore, an equitable water apportionment 
is necessary between the two states whether or not the treaty is modified. 
This section of the paper will investigate the rationality of modifying the 
treaty and the official stance adopted by India and Pakistan regarding the 
modification. 
145. To know more about the roles and responsibilities of Permanent Indus Commission
assigned by the IWT, see id. art. 8. 
146. See id. art. 9. 
147. See id. art. 9(5). 
148. KAYA, supra note 139, at 75–76. 
149. SATISH KUMAR, INDIA’S NATIONAL SECURITY: ANNUAL REVIEW 2010, 413 (2013)
[hereinafter KUMAR].
150. EARLE, supra note 110, at 66. 
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A. Pragmatic Rationales for Modifications 
Until now, Pakistan has opposed any idea of modifying the IWT, though
India has keenly advocated for the modification.151 However, there are
certain problems related to water allocation, dispute resolution, and some 
other limitations in the IWT that drive the arguments in favor of slight 
modification of IWT for the reasonable and just allocation and utilization 
of water for both countries. For instance, the failure to consider climatic
changes and hydrological factors is also an important limitation of the treaty. 
Both countries are facing problems related to inefficient water usage and
management,152 but blame each other for causing hindrances in their water- 
management ambitions. The main factors in modifying the IWT are set out
in detail below. 
1. Issues in River Waters Utilization 
The IWT allocated the three western rivers to Pakistan and the three
eastern rivers to India in accordance with the principles of equity and
equitable utilization; however, the contemporary nature of the usage of 
western river waters by India has made the utilization contentious.153 India
is technically enjoying the waters of all six rivers as it is constructing 
hydropower projects on the western rivers within its territory and utilizing 
the waters of the eastern rivers for agricultural and other purposes to their 
full magnitude.154 On the other hand, Pakistan is facing the danger of
being deprived of the waters of the western rivers allotted to it by the IWT, 
because Indian hydropower projects and dams on the western rivers are
inviting massive shortages of waters in the western rivers.155 In the
continuation (and exacerbation) of this water shortage risk, the portions 
of the eastern river basins located in Pakistan have nearly become marshlands 
due to the almost complete absence of water in these rivers, particularly
 151. Anwer Iqbal, Pakistan not to accept alteration in Indus Waters Treaty, DAWN
(Dec. 17, 2016), http://www.dawn.com/news/1302848 [https://perma.cc/5AA9-GEZG]
[hereinafter Iqbal]. 
152. BINAYAK RAY, CLIMATE CHANGE: IPCC, WATER CRISIS, AND POLICY RIDDLES
WITH REFERENCE TO INDIA AND HER SURROUNDINGS 121 (2011).
153. See Shehzad, supra note 99, at 142; see also NAROTTAM P. BANSKOTA, SOUTH ASIA
TRADE AND ENERGY SECURITY: THE ROLE OF INDIA 81 (2012).
154. WIRSING & ADEEL, supra note 95, at 42; see also Adnan Nawaz & Rizwanullah 
Kokab, Indus Water Treaty: Need For Review, 2 ASIAN JOURNAL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES &
HUMANITIES 210, 212 (2013) [hereinafter Nawaz & Kokab]. 
155. See Nawaz & Kokab, supra note 154, at 212; see also WIRSING & ADEEL, supra
note 95, at 42.
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during winter, when there is inadequate rainfall in the region; moreover,
the availability of water in the western rivers has also fallen substantially.156 
Thus, the situation is now that India, being the upper riparian state, is 
getting the full amount of water from the western and eastern rivers. On
the other hand, Pakistan cannot even reasonably use the eastern rivers and 
also risks of losing the waters of its western rivers due to the perceived 
completion in the near future of India’s mass water-storage dams on the 
western rivers, which have the potential to cause a shortage in the western 
river basins.157 Therefore, Pakistan, being the lower riparian state, receives a
share of water that is less than it was allocated by the IWT. This situation 
indicates an inequitable utilization and unbalanced availability of river 
waters between the two states, which is against the principles of equity, 
justice, and morality, and against the Indus Waters Treaty, which gives 
legitimate ownership of the western rivers to Pakistan.158 
Because of the inequitable availability and utilization of water, there is 
a need to implement a strategy that could allow the lower riparian Pakistani
region to equitably and justly use waters from the eastern and western rivers 
in a fashion similar to India’s utilization of the six rivers. 
2. Construction of Dams
A major drawback of the Indus Waters Treaty is that it does not apply a 
limit on the construction of dams on the rivers allotted to the other country.159 
That is, there is nothing mentioned in the Indus Waters Treaty to restrict 
an upper riparian state from building dams over the rivers of another country.160 
Owing to such an absence of any restriction on the construction of dams
over the other country’s allotted rivers, India is continuing to build as many
dams as it can on the western rivers.161 Furthermore, it also plans to construct
 156. See GWYNNE DYER, CLIMATE WARS: THE FIGHT FOR SURVIVAL AS THE WORLD
OVERHEATS (2010); see also Jane Qiu, Stressed Indus River threatens Pakistan’s water 
supplies, NATURE (June 29, 2016), http://www.nature.com/news/stressed-indus-river­
threatens-pakistan-s-water-supplies-1.20180 [https://perma.cc/7VTM-SUQK].
157. See Nawaz & Kokab, supra note 154, at 212. 
158. NAROTTAM P. BANSKOTA, SOUTH ASIA TRADE AND ENERGY SECURITY: THE ROLE
OF INDIA 80-81 (2012) [hereinafter BANSKOTA].
159. See Nawaz & Kokab, supra note 154, at 213. 
160. This assertion can be inferred after reading the complete draft of the Indus Waters 
Treaty that there is nothing mentioned in the treaty that restricts a country from building
dams beyond a certain number on the rivers allotted to another country.
161. See Shehzad, supra note 99, at 142. 
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more water-storage dams and barrages on the western rivers in the near 
future,162 while ignoring the fact that these projects can cause a shortage
of water in the western river basins in Pakistan.163 Pakistan has commented
on these facts on a number of occasions in bilateral dialogues and in the 
meetings of various international forums.164 
To avert any serious water shortage in Pakistan caused by Indian dams
on the western rivers, a limit could be imposed on the construction of dams
over the rivers of the other country. The Indus Waters Treaty needs to
consider these aspects and the relevant issues to equitably allocate waters
to both countries, rather than letting the upper riparian to install benefits 
while leaving the lower riparian state to remain naturally disadvantaged in its
share of waters from the shared river basins. 
3. Slow Dispute Resolution Mechanism 
Another aspect of the IWT with which both India and Pakistan are 
discontented is the slowness of the dispute resolution mechanism of the 
IWT.165 India blames Pakistan for causing a delay in its developmental
projects over the western rivers, while Pakistan raises concerns over Indian
projects on the western rivers and has approached the dispute resolution
mechanism of the IWT.166 On the other hand, the UNDP has also recently 
published a report in which it put the blame on Pakistan for causing a delay 
in resolving the dispute with India over the contemporary water conflict.167 
However, the truth is that if we analyze the pace of the dispute resolution 
process offered by the IWT, then we can identify that the delay is inherent 
in almost all of the phases of this process. It is neither India nor Pakistan 
that causes the delay, rather the inherent nature of the IWT dispute resolution 
mechanism, which takes years to resolve a single dispute.168 
For instance, when the dispute is first raised, dialogues are held between
the officials of the two states through the Permanent Indus Commission.169 
These dialogues can take several months or years to produce a mutually
 162. See Dr. Shaheen Akhtar, Emerging Challenges to Indus Waters Treaty, INSTITUTE
OF REGIONAL STUDIES 27–28 (2011) [hereinafter Akhtar].
163. Id. at 46, 53. 
164. Id. 
165. ASIF BAIG MIRZA, PERFORMANCE OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION MECHANISM OF THE
INDUS WATERS TREATY 18 (2013) [hereinafter MIRZA].
166. See Akhtar, supra note 162, at 15. 
167. See UN report blames Pakistan for delay in resolution of Indus water issues
with India, THE TIMES OF INDIA, Feb. 2, 2017, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/
pakistan/un-report-blames-pakistan-for-delay-in-resolution-of-indus-water-issues-with­
india/articleshow/56935697.cms [https://perma.cc/QV66-DFHC].
168. See MIRZA, supra note 165, at 18. 
169. See id. at 11. 
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agreed framework. In this regard, the mutual distrust of both countries also
prevents the speedy resolution of differences in the bilateral talks and, most 
of the time, leads to an impasse between both them.170 In the aftermath of 
the failure of dialogues, meetings are held with the officials of World Bank
to decide upon the appointment of a neutral expert. Here again, the meetings
with the World Bank officials can take several weeks or months, especially 
when both parties lack confidence in the neutral expert suggested by the 
World Bank.
Nonetheless, after the appointment, the neutral expert may also take several 
months, or over a year, to decide on the disagreements between the states,
because both states present their cases in a very rational and convincing 
manner.171 If the neutral expert is unable to determine the dispute, a similar 
delay occurs in the hearings of the case after it is referred to the Court of 
Arbitration.172 Hence, the process takes several years.173 
Meanwhile, if the World Bank or the Court orders India to temporarily 
pause its disputed water-storage construction work until the final verdict
is given on the legality of the construction work, this raises the cost of the
project for India owing to the delay in completing the project.174 For instance, 
the delay increases the interest rate charges when most of the capital deployed
in construction is borrowed by the state.175 Such a delay outweighs the societal 
benefits of the project.176 
Similarly, if the construction work is not paused, then it damages the
Pakistani stance177 because India continues construction during the hearing 
of the case. When the judgment is subsequently handed down, India has
 170. See THE MAHBUB UL HAQ HUMAN DEV. CTR., HUMAN DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH
ASIA 26 (2005), http://mhhdc.org/wp-content/themes/mhdc/reports/HDSA_2005.pdf [https://
perma.cc/8U2N-3FAQ].
171. For instance, for the case of Baglihar dam, request to World Bank for
appointment of neutral expert was made on January 15, 2005, and the neutral expert was 
appointed after four months on May 12, 2005. Afterwards, the neutral expert took 20 
months to decide on the issue and gave his ruling on February 12. This was quite a long
period as a substantial portion of the Baglihar dam got completed during this period, which
weakened Pakistan’s case against the dam. For details, see Akhtar, supra note 162, at 38– 
39. 
172.  Gregory F. Treverton, Dividing Divided States 119 (2014). 
173. See Nawaz & Kokab, supra note 154, at 213. 
174. See NEEL MANI P. VERMA, IRRIGATION IN INDIA 57, 59, 62 (1993). 
175. STEPHEN MERRETT, WATER FOR AGRICULTURE 63 (2002). 
176. VIRENDRA KUMAR, COMMITTEES AND COMMISSIONS IN INDIA 104 (1976).
177. See Akhtar, supra note 162, at 65. 
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already a completed major portion of the contentious project.178 Therefore, it
is impractical for the Court or the neutral expert to cancel the Indian project 
or to order the demolition of the construction. Hence, the delay in the dispute 
resolution causes harm, predominantly to Pakistan, as is evident from the
disputes that were referred to the Court of Arbitration or to the neutral 
expert over the last two decades.179 
The dispute related to Baglehar Dam and the consequent decision by the
neutral expert is an example of the delay caused by the dispute resolution 
mechanism. The dispute started in 1999, when India commenced the 
construction of Baglehar Dam.180 Pakistan raised concerns with India over 
the design of the dam in 2008.181 After five years of bilateral talks with
India,182 when no resolution was reached, Pakistan approached the World 
Bank in 2005.183 The World Bank appointed Raymond Lafitte as the neutral
expert to hear the dispute between India and Pakistan.184 Unfortunately, 
the final verdict by the neutral expert came too late, in 2007, because India 
had already completed more than 70 percent of the construction and was 
scheduled to complete it only one year later.185 
Even though the decision of the neutral expert was not in favor of
Pakistan,186 what could have been done if the decision had been in its
favor? The answer is contentious, as India would not have wanted to abandon
the almost-completed dam, wasting the enormous amount of money it had
spent on construction. This result could have increased hostility between
the two nuclear powers of South Asia. To avoid the occurrence of such 
hostilities, and to resolve the water-sharing disputes quickly, it is necessary 
to solidify and quicken the dispute resolution process of the IWT, which can 
be achieved by slightly modifying the treaty by mutual agreement between
the states.
178. For instance, India had already completed the gate-structure of the Baglehar
Dam in 2004 and a major part of the dam when the dispute was referred by Pakistan to the 
World Bank for mediation. India continued the construction during the hearings of the 
dispute by the neutral expert. See id. at 38. 
179. See id. at 37, 49 (for previous examples of India continuing construction despite 
Pakistan raising dispute over the construction).
180. CHRISTINA LEB ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND FRESHWATER: THE MULTIPLE
CHALLENGES 417 (2013) [hereinafter LEB ET AL].
(July 2, 2002), http://www.dawn.com/news/640989 [https://perma.cc/W3QT-YMSR].
181. 
182. 





Id. at 38; see also LEB ET AL., supra note 180, at 417. 
See Akhtar, supra note 162, at 38. 
Id. at 38–39. 
186. See generally 2007: Neutral expert gives his judgement on Baglihar Dam, DAWN
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4. Failure to Consider Climatic Changes 
Climatic changes and their impacts on water quantity in the shared river 
basins have not been addressed expressly by the IWT.187 For instance, the
IWT does not guide Pakistan to make the arrangements necessary to protect 
its region from flooding if large flows of waters are discharged from India 
into Pakistani rivers.188 Similarly, the IWT also provides no instructions
for averting the situations of droughts and utilizing water shares appropriately
in times of shortage of water in the river basins.189 For instance, if either
the eastern or western river basin faces a shortage of water due to inadequate 
rain, there are no provisions on the suitable pattern of water utilization by 
each country from a single basin.190 These limitations, related to the impacts
of climate change, need to be addressed by the IWT and, for this purpose,
appropriate modification can be done to the treaty via bilateral discussions. 
5. Failure to Consider Underground Waters 
Another limitation of the IWT is that it does not fully consider the
hydrological factors and usage of groundwater.191 For instance, Pakistan 
is not getting adequate water from the eastern river basins, because these
rivers were allocated to India.192 In such a case, the agrarian regions that 
were previously dependent on the waters of the eastern rivers are using 
groundwater by installing tube-wells to irrigate crops. A similar case is the
Indian Punjab, where the majority of the villages use tube-wells to irrigate 
crops despite the availability of river waters and canals there.193 This usage is
significantly lowering the levels and overall amount of groundwater in both
countries.194 IWT says nothing about the utilization of groundwater and 
the relevant hydrological factors.195 To cater to the water-related needs of both 
states, the IWT should include provisions that provide equitable, reasonable,
 187. Hamid Sarfraz, Revisiting the 1960 Indus Water Treaty, 38 Water International
204, 205 (2013), http://www.devconsult.pk/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Revisiting-the­
1960-Indus-Waters-Treaty-Water-International.pdf [https://perma.cc/2GRP-M3CW]. 
188.  See id.
 189. See id.
 190. See id.
 191. See Nawaz & Kokab, supra note 154, at 210–11. 
192. See BANSKOTA, supra note 158, at 80–81. 
193. Asma Yaqoob, Indus Waters Across 50 Years: A Comparative Study of The 
Management Methodologies Of India And Pakistan 26–27 (2013). 
194. See Sarfraz, supra note 187, at 5.
 195. See Nawaz & Kokab, supra note 154, at 211, 214. 
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justifiable, and efficient allocation and consumption of groundwater because
IWT is the only bilaterally agreed treaty that equitably apportions the shared
waters between the two hostile countries. 
B. Indian Stance Toward Modification 
The Indian stance largely favors the modification of the IWT; however, 
this mainly relates to the utilization of Pakistani river waters by India.
India’s rationale for modifying the treaty is that it wants a greater share of 
the waters of the Indus basin to satisfy the agrarian and electricity demands 
of its growing population,196 and, for this purpose, it wants to modify the
treaty to increase its share and override any objections from Pakistan.197 
However, it is pertinent to note that the aforementioned Indian demands
actually involve an inequitable and unreasonable reapportionment and
utilization of the Indus waters, as the fulfillment of such demands would 
result in a shortage of river water in Pakistan.198 Such a situation would 
cause significant harm to Pakistan’s agricultural economy.199 More importantly,
such an allocation of a higher share to upper riparian India at the price of 
depriving Pakistan of vital water rights is also against the principles of equity,
justice, and equitable utilization, which all necessitate water apportionment 
on the basis of equality and justice.200 As these principles are universally 
recognized principles of international law,201 and therefore, it can be asserted 
that the Indian stance related to acquiring a larger share in the Pakistani rivers 
by modifying the treaty is largely unacceptable and not in accordance with
international law.
1. Perceived Benefits for India from Modification 
If India is able to modify the IWT as per its propositions, then India can 
acquire a greater, but unreasonable share, of water in the western rivers,
especially in the Indus River, which has a larger quantity of water than the 
196. See KUMAR, supra note 149, at 413. 
197. Govt Decides to Fast-track Irrigation Projects in Indus Basin, HINDUSTAN
TIMES (Oct. 23, 2016), http://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/govt-decides-to-fast­
track-irrigation-projects-in-indus-basin/story-veUrap7NSYcQTJTFKNeIML.html 
[https://perma.cc/X9L6-TJEA]. 
198. See Shehzad, supra note 99, at 144; see also Nawaz & Kokab, supra note 154, 
at 212. 
199. See Shehzad, supra note 99, at 144. 
200. DEGEFU, supra note 108; see also CHAUHAN, supra note 103. 
201. For equitable apportionment, see EARLE, supra note 110, at 66. For principles
of justice and equity, see JACKSON H. RALSTON, SUPPLEMENT TO 1926, REVISED EDITION 
OF THE LAW AND PROCEDURE OF INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 31 (1936). 
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other two western rivers. The apparent benefits for India from IWT modification 
are illustrated below: 
1.	 India would be able to allocate more water for its agricultural 
and hydropower projects, while ignoring the fact that such 
an allocation is principally inequitable in nature.202 
2.	 In the event of an inequitable and greater share owned by 
India, it would be able to disrupt the water flow of the western
rivers by either discharging extra water or by blocking a
significant amount of water flow to put Pakistan under 
pressure.203 Thus, India can employ its share of the western 
rivers as a bargaining tool for the resolution of its geopolitical
and strategic issues with Pakistan.204 Consequently, India can
attempt to become a regional hegemon after it has successfully 
pressurized Pakistan, by using water as a “trump card.” 
3.	 Any modification that quickens the dispute resolution process
of the IWT would prevent delays in dispute resolution and
a consequent increase in the costs of completing the Indian 
projects that would be disputed by Pakistan owing to their 
contentious design.205 
Most of the abovementioned benefits for India would, in fact, result in
harm to Pakistan by depriving it of a large quantity of water that would be 
allocated to India, in contradiction to the principles of equity and justice.206 
Therefore, instead of implementing the Indian suggestions, a neutral and
mediated perspective should be included for the modification of the IWT 
for upholding the principles of equity and justice. 
2. Dangers to India from Modification 
In addition to the benefits, there are also certain harms for India related 
to the modifications of IWT. These are explained below: 
1.	 The Indus River basin is broad enough to inundate the nearby
lands if its water is diverted disproportionately for the sake
 202. India Speeding Up Indus Basin Water Plan: Report, Dawn (Dec. 23, 2016), http:// 
www.dawn.com/news/1304008 [https://perma.cc/8574-VEZV].
203. Id.
 204. AMITA GUPTA, GLOBAL SECURITY WATCH—INDIA 52 (2012) [hereinafter GUPTA].
205. See Akhtar, supra note 162, at 37–39, 49, 15. 
206. See Nawaz & Kokab, supra note 154, at 215. 
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of using surplus water in the upper riparian state.207 Therefore,
if the IWT allocates the Indus River water to India, and
consequently India is able to divert substantial amounts of 
Indus river water away from Pakistan, then in the monsoon
season the quantity of water flow in the Indus River within 
Indian territory would increase substantially and may result 
in inundating vast agrarian lands within India. This can result
in damage to crops and, subsequently, in a shortage of food
in India. Therefore, India must not consider diverting the
western river toward its own land as an option for getting
surplus water.
2.	 An inequitable and unjust allocation of river waters resulting 
from the modification of the treaty could ignite conflicts with
Pakistan. Moreover, any hindrance caused by India in the
flow of Pakistani rivers would be considered by Pakistan a 
threat to its solidarity and survival, because more than half 
of the Pakistani population is dependent on agriculture, which 
employs western river waters to irrigate crops.208 This threat
can never be considered lightly by Pakistan; therefore, it 
can increase the chances of violent conflict between the two 
states if the dispute is not resolved by peaceful means.209 
Such a situation would tarnish India’s reputation and would
portray it as a state involved in a water-allocation conflict 
with its neighbor state.210 Consequently, India would no more
be able to depict its positive image to the international world, 
which it does at present, as it is included in the G-20.211 
3.	 It is plausible to assert that India may not get its desired
amount of waters even after the modification of the treaty 
because, at present, Pakistan faces a shortage of water in its
eastern and western river basins,212 because India is already 
availing itself of the full amount of water in its eastern and 
western river basins.213 Therefore, it is possible that India
 207. For previous instances of similar flooding, see James Syvitski & Robert Brakenridge, 
Causation and Avoidance of Catastrophic Flooding along the Indus River, Pakistan, 7–9 
GSA TODAY (January 2013), https://floodobservatory.colorado.edu/publications/gsatv23n01_
13-sc[1].pdf [https://perma.cc/2JKV-Z6RA].
208. AARON MARCUS, DESIGN, USER EXPERIENCE, AND USABILITY 574 (2014). 
209. See GUPTA, supra note 204. 
210. See BANSKOTA, supra note 158, at 81. 
211. India’s Participation, G20 INDIA SECRETARIAT, http://www.g20india.gov.in/about­
ip.asp?lk=about4 [https://perma.cc/EU4X-YKET] (last visited Mar. 28, 2017). 
212. See Nawaz & Kokab, supra note 154, at 212. 
213. Id. 
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will lose its share in the western rivers if modification of the
treaty is called on to uphold the justice and equity principles. 
This can harm the Indian intentions to gain control over the 
Indus basin214, however such harm may be helpful in maintaining 
the balance of power and justice in the region.215 
C. Pakistani Stance Toward Modification 
Pakistan has not officially accepted the suggestions of modifications of
the IWT because it has concerns over the Indian call to modify the treaty.216 
It has adopted the stance that the IWT has been a solid regulatory framework 
for apportioning shared waters between India and Pakistan for more than
five decades and, therefore, this treaty should be honored and followed 
now and in the future.217 Moreover, the Indus Waters Treaty was devised
after several years of rigorous negotiations,218 whereas the contemporary 
nature of hostility between India and Pakistan could prevent the modification 
of such a deal.219 
Furthermore, Pakistan has serious apprehensions over Indian attempts
to gain regional political domination.220 Pakistan views the Indian call to 
modify the IWT as primarily hegemonic in nature.221 Any such attempts
are unacceptable to Pakistan as they can result in increasing its existing 
hostility with India, as both countries have historically been archrivals.222 
Therefore, Pakistan does not accept the Indian call for modifications of 
the treaty. However, it can negotiate over its stance if a third party offers 
to act as a neutral guarantor in facilitating arbitration between the countries
and in protecting the interests of both states, especially those of the lower
 214. See WIRSING & ADEEL, supra note 95, at 40. 
215.  Satish Kumar, India’s National Security: Annual Review 2010 (2010-11). 
216. Hussain Zaidi, The Indus Waters Treaty, NEWS INT’L (Oct. 8, 2016), https:// 
www.thenews.com.pk/print/155658-the-indus-waters-treaty [https://perma.cc/V9ZK-JSUC] 
[hereinafter Zaidi]. 
217. See UPRETY & SALMAN, supra note 55.
 218. See MALHOTRA, supra note 136. 
219. V.K. Sashikumar, Why Indus Waters Treaty Has Stood The Test of Time, HERALD 
DAWN (Sept. 30, 2016), http://herald.dawn.com/news/1153544 [https://perma.cc/4SC7­
MD36].
220. See India’s objection to a Pakistani secretary general may hurt Saarc, DAWN
(Feb. 2, 2017), http://www.dawn.com/news/1311965 [https://perma.cc/FU9P-T46L]. 
221. See Zaidi, supra note 216. 
222. See GUPTA, supra note 204. 
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riparian state, because a third party acting as a guarantor would be more
trustworthy for Pakistan than its hostile neighbor, India.223 
1. Apparent Benefits for Pakistan from Modification 
Certain modifications of the IWT could also bring the following positive 
results for Pakistan if the modification can allocate an equitable share of 
the river waters to Pakistan, as the country is currently utilizing a diminished 
share of the water, as explained above.224 The following rewards can be
attained by Pakistan by modifying the IWT in its favor: 
1.	 A quickened dispute resolution mechanism will facilitate 
Pakistan to seek justice quickly over the water shortage disputes 
raised by it in response to any unjust utilization of shared 
river waters by India.225 Justice would not be delayed and
this would compel India to not use shared waters unreasonably 
and inequitably within its own territory. Consequently, Pakistan
would get the full flow of waters in the western rivers.
2.	 A reasonable and adequate water supply in the western rivers 
can also increase Pakistani agricultural production, because 
sufficient water would be available for irrigating crops, which 
is not the case at present.226 
3.	 An increase in water supply resulted from the modification 
in IWT will also decrease the pressure on groundwater in 
Pakistan and would result in reducing the usage of groundwater 
resources for irrigation.227 Subsequently, it will also reduce
salinity and other factors harmful to agrarian lands in Pakistan.
4.	 An adequate water flow in rivers would provide a larger amount
of fresh water to a number of regions in Pakistan.228 As
a result, more of the population could utilize fresh water 
for fulfilling their drinking, sanitation, and domestic needs,
because a significant population in Pakistan depends on 
river waters for their needs. 
223. Id. at 184–85. 
224.  Nawaz & Kokab. supra note 154, at 210, 212–17. 
225. See MIRZA, supra note 165, at 18. 
226. Bashir Ahmad Solehria et al., Use of Poor Quality Groundwater Through Conjunctive 
Water Management, in JEHANGIR W.A.,SUSTAININGSURFACE AND GROUNDWATER RESOURCES
166 (2002). 
227. Id. 
228. SAMI UL-ALLAH, TOWARDS A WATER AND NUTRIENT EFFICIENT FORAGE PRODUCTION
IN SEMI-ARID REGIONS OF PAKISTAN 62 (2014). 
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The aforementioned benefits for Pakistan are possible only if the issues 
that are faced by Pakistan in accessing an equitable portion of river waters
are acknowledged by its upper riparian neighbor, India, and by any third
party that may become involved in the future for mediation between India 
and Pakistan in the modification of the IWT. Regrettably, the possibility
of such cooperation between the states is highly unlikely as India has a 
notorious track record of not accepting Pakistan’s concerns and issues of
a bilateral nature;229 therefore, Pakistan has maintained an official stance 
of not accepting the Indian standpoint toward modifying the IWT.230 
Nonetheless, Pakistan can turn toward the modification of the treaty if a 
reasonable and equitable share of water resources is guaranteed to Pakistan
and, preferably, if a neutral third party offers to broker the modification 
process for upholding the principles of equitable utilization, equity, and 
justice.231 
2. Dangers to Pakistan from Modification 
In addition to some perceived benefits of modification, there are some
potential risks for Pakistan associated with the modification of IWT. These
are identified below: 
1.	 If modification takes place according to Indian preferences,
then Pakistan would be deprived of its fair share of the
western rivers.232 
2.	 On the other hand, if the modification that occurs in accordance
to Pakistani demands for water, then it can compel India to 
increase the water supply to Pakistan.233 In the aftermath, a
threat exists that India may discharge a significantly higher 
amount of water that could not be managed by the Pakistani 
government as the country does not have substantial water-
storage facilities. The consequent effect would be the inundation 
229. As evident from the history as explained in, DEVLEENA GHOSH ET AL., WATER,
SOVEREIGNTY AND BORDERS IN ASIA AND OCEANIA 90 (2009).
230. See Iqbal, supra note 151. 
231. For instance, IWT was also brokered by a neutral party, World Bank. See GUY
J.-M. LE MOIGNE, AND SYED S. KIRMANI, FOSTERING RIPARIAN COOPERATION IN INTERNATIONAL
RIVER BASINS: THE WORLD BANK AT ITS BEST IN DEVELOPMENT DIPLOMACY 5 (1997). 
232. ARIEL DINAR, BRIDGES OVER WATER: UNDERSTANDING TRANSBOUNDARY WATER
CONFLICT, NEGOTIATION AND COOPERATION 279 (2007).
233. See WIRSING & ADEEL, supra note 95, at 86.
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of a massive swathe of land in Pakistan, which can also 
damage crops. 
3.	 If the Indian stance is not accepted in the modification of 
the treaty and only the Pakistani stance is approved, then
there is a chance of the modification process failing or of 
the Indus Waters Treaty being cancelled on the Indian side.234 
This would result in a crisis in the absence of any principle
for regulating the share of water between the two hostile
nations. Consequently, such a situation can instigate water
conflicts in a similar fashion as arose after partition, when 
India stopped all water supplies to Pakistan.235 The recurrence 
of such a situation will be more damaging to Pakistan because, 
compared to the past, a larger population is dependent on
river waters for irrigating crops and for domestic usage.236 
It is also noticeable that the resultant nature of the conflict 
between India and Pakistan now or in the future can be of a 
more serious nature than previously because both countries 
now possess nuclear weapons. 
D. The Idea of “Needs” and “Wants”
This section discusses “needs” and “wants” in relation to access to water 
by a state. The word “need” originated from the twelfth-century Anglo-Saxon 
word “nied,” which means “a necessity or duty.”237 On the other hand, the
word “want” means “a wish” or “lacking.”238 John Maerz has illustrated 
these differences in his book A Mile in Your Shoes. He further explains: 
The indispensable part seems to be mostly attached to a need . . . the words need
and necessity relating to the survival of the individual [whereas] a desire or a want
as the product of a real or imagined luck.239 
In this context, the “need to access water” implies a nonnegotiable 
requirement of a state to access and use water for the survival of its
population, whereas the “want to access water” is not mainly focused on 
the utilization of water for survival but for economic development. Clearly,
 234. See Zaidi, supra note 216. 
235. Awais Piracha & Zahid Majeed, Water Use in Pakistan’s Agricultural Sector: 
Water Conservation under the Changed Climatic Conditions, INT’L J. OF WATER RESOURCES 
AND ARID ENV’TS 170, 172 (2011). 
236. M. Mushtaq Chaudry, Integrated Water Resources Management in Pakistan, 
NETWORK OF ASIAN RIVER BASIN ORG. 1–3 (2014), http://www.narbo.jp/data/01_events/materials/
gm01_pas_b02_pa.pdf [https://perma.cc/J62Z-8GZ3]. 
237. JOHN MAERZ, A MILE IN YOUR SHOES 69 (2012) [hereinafter MAERZ].
238. Id. In the Oxford English Dictionary, the word “want” means “desire.”
239. See MAERZ, supra note 237, at 69. 
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human survival is anterior to economic development, in accordance with 
international water law; therefore, in apportioning and utilizing waters, it 
is obligatory for states to give preference to such a utilization of water
necessary for human survival.240 This is also evident from the Berlin Rules 
on Watercourses 2004, which are globally accepted principles for water
allocation and utilization, prioritizing the allocation of water to human
survival.241 
The need to access water can be intended for drinking, irrigating crops, 
and sanitation purposes.242 Drinking water is necessary for human life,
whereas irrigating is a requirement for producing crops for producing 
adequate food for the sustenance of the population. Meanwhile, sanitation
is required for the protection of the people’s health. On the other hand, the 
desire to access and use water implies making water-storage facilities, i.e.,
dams for the production of electricity by installing hydropower projects 
and barrages for diverting adequate water supply of rivers to these dams.
In this regard, such utilization is “not a basic need” for the survival of the 
population, which is possible without such storage facilities and projects. 
As the need to use water for human survival is seen as higher than the
want or desire to use water for economic development, the utilization of 
water for basic needs should be given preferential treatment over the
utilization of water for electricity generation. 
If we apply the aforementioned concepts of “needs” and “wants” to
accessing and using water in the case of the upper and lower riparian states, 
for example Pakistan and India, then the following implications are notable:
1.	 Pakistan “needs” adequate water supply for irrigating crops 
and for the survival of a large proportion of its population
to fulfill their basic needs of life, i.e., drinking and irrigating. 
2.	 Pakistan is not pursuing any “wants” to construct hydropower 
projects over any of the eastern or western rivers that could 
lead to any population being deprived from satiating basic 
needs related to water usage.243
 240. See BISWAS ET AL., supra note 79. 
241. See Boyle et al., supra note 85, art. 14, at 21–22. 
242. Id. 
243. Being a lower riparian state, Pakistan has no other lower riparian international 
state whose share of transboundary river water it can compromise over. 
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3.	 India is pursuing its “wants” to construct dams on the western
rivers for hydropower projects to produce electricity.244 
These wants have the potential effects of overriding and
negating Pakistanis’ needs to access and use water because
the relevant Indian projects of mass water-storage facilities 
could affect the natural flow of water of rivers in Pakistan, 
resulting in an overall shortage of water in these rivers.245 
4.	 India also “needs” an adequate water supply to irrigate its 
agrarian lands to meet the food requirements of its population,
which it is already meeting from the full utilization of the 
waters of the eastern and western rivers.246 Hence, its needs
are already fulfilled. 
5.	 India “wants” to access more water of the western rivers
by exploiting its allocated water share for agriculture, electricity,
or any other economic development projects in the near
future.247 It is looking to fulfill its wants, not needs, to utilize 
water.
The above points illustrate the differences between the needs and wants 
of Pakistan and India in utilizing waters of the shared river basins. The 
Indian population can survive without the hydropower projects, whereas 
it is impossible for a significant number of the Pakistani population to 
survive if an adequate water supply is impeded by the Indian mass water-
storage projects. Because there is already significant stress on water resources 
in Pakistan owing to the scarcity of water and the surge in the population 
dependent on these water resources, India should not excessively use 
Pakistani river waters to produce electricity. While the manufacturing of
electricity is beneficial for the economic development of India, there are 
certainly several ways other than the utilization of precious water resources 
to produce electricity, i.e., through solar energy, wind energy, coal, and 
biofuel. India can use these alternate sources to produce electricity. This
can also ensure the availability of adequate water for the people of Pakistan
for drinking and irrigating purposes, and, eventually, will uphold the principles 
of equitable utilization, equity, and justice. 
244. For details of the Indian planned and continued projects, see Akhtar, supra note 
162, at 27–28. 
245. INST. REGIONAL STUD. & NAT’L COMM’N HUM. DEV., NON-TRADITIONAL AND
HUMAN SECURITY IN SOUTH ASIA 172 (2007) [hereinafter IRS & NCHD]; see also UNESCO,
Managing Water Under Uncertainty and Risk, 1 U.N. WORLD WATER DEV. REP. 4, 219 
(2012).
246.  Nawaz & Kokab, supra note 154, at 212, 214–15. 
247. UNESCO, Managing Water Under Uncertainty and Risk, 1 U.N. WORLD WATER
DEV. REP. 4, 219 (2012). 
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CONCLUSION
Adherence to the principles of equity and justice is necessitated by
international law for the equitable allocation of resources, including 
transnational river waters between two or more states.248 Several theories
and doctrines have been presented to do this. The absolute territorial theory
favored the upper riparian state’s right to use and allocate water,249 whereas 
the territorial integrity theory rejected any such right.250 Due to the inequitable 
water-sharing suggestions of these theories, they were rejected by lower
riparian states and upper riparian states, respectively.251 Subsequently, the
limited sovereignty theory was presented, which applied a limit on the 
supreme right to access and use water by upper and lower riparian states.252 
Doctrines endorsing the equitable apportionment of shared river water 
between states were then presented.253 The riparian rights doctrine proposes
two strategies for water apportionment: (1) the reasonable utilization of water
for equitably apportioning the shared water and (2) correlative rights, which 
entail a proportional utilization of water resources according to the proportion 
of the shared water territory owned by a state.254 On the other hand, the prior
appropriation right gives ownership of the water resource to the first user 
of the water resource.255 
The unity of the river basin principle declares a transboundary river to 
be a single river basin that cannot be owned by either of the two states sharing 
this river.256 A collective ownership of the river basin is assigned to both 
riparian states.257 On the other hand, the equitable utilization and apportionment
doctrine suggests equitably and justifiably apportioning water between two 
or more states. It upholds the principles of equity and justice258 and therefore
has been incorporated into the Berlin Rules, which are considered standards
 248. See DEGEFU, supra note 108. 
249. Stephen C. Lonergan & David B. Brooks, Watershed: The Role of Fresh Water
in the Israeli Palestinian Conflict, INT’L DEV. RESEARCH CTR. 168 (1994). 
250. Brauch et al., supra note 23, at 657. 
251. For absolute territorial sovereignty theory, see ADAR & CHECK, supra note 20, 
at 12; for absolute territorial integrity theory, see: ISLAM, supra note 14, at 106–07.
 252. See Dellapenna, supra note 115. 
253. Id. 
254. See DZURIK, supra note 40, at 26. 
255. See Schneier-Madanes & Courel, supra note 50. 
256. See MCINTYRE, supra note 73. 
257. See Libai, supra note 29, at 21–55, 31. 
258. See CHAUHAN, supra note 103; see also DEGEFU, supra note 108. 
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for reasonably and sustainably allocating shared waters between two or
more states.259 
The Indus Waters Treaty is a very good example of equitably distributing 
water between upper riparian India and lower riparian Pakistan as it divided
the six shared rivers between India and Pakistan in an equitable manner 
by allocating the three western rivers to Pakistan and the three eastern
rivers to India.260 However, India wants to modify this long-standing
treaty in order to get a legal basis for acquiring and utilizing a larger share 
of water from the Pakistani western rivers.261 Pakistan has rejected Indian
aims to modify the treaty because it considers that Indian plans for
modifications are largely related to legitimizing its construction works of
mass storage dams on Pakistani rivers. According to Pakistan, these dams
have the tendency to cause a shortage of water in Pakistan.262 
Currently, India is enjoying the full amount of water in the eastern and 
western rivers in its territory because it is an upper riparian state where
water naturally reaches it in full flow, whereas Pakistan is being deprived 
of the full flow of waters in its western rivers owing to Indian mass storage 
dams.263 This contrasts with the principles of equity and justice as well as
with the Indus Waters Treaty, which has assigned legal ownership of the 
western rivers to Pakistan and restricted India to using waters only for
nonconsumptive purposes.264 
Pakistan’s access to and utilization of these river waters are required for 
basic human subsistence within its territory, whereas Indian mass storage
dams are only intended for economic development purposes, i.e., for the 
generation of electricity.265 As per the Berlin Rules, the preference is assigned 
to the utilization of water for basic human subsistence over utilization for 
any other purposes.266 Therefore, to uphold the principles of justice, morality, 
and equity, India needs to respect the Pakistani people’s basic needs for 
water.
 259. See EARLE, supra note 110. 
260. See WIRSING & ADEEL, supra note 95. 
261. CHRISTOPHER JASPARRO ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT OVER WATER RESOURCES
IN HIMALAYAN ASIA 210 (2012); see also India builds huge reservoirs to stop Pakistan’s 
water, THE NATION (23 December 2016), http://nation.com.pk/national/23-Dec-2016/india­
builds-huge-reservoirs-to-stop-pakistan-s-water [https://perma.cc/UDA9-P4H9]. 
262. See IRS & NCHD, supra note 245; see also UNESCO, supra note 247. 
263. See Nawaz & Kokab, supra note 154, at 212, 214–15. 
264. See Indus Waters Treaty, supra note 60, art. III.
 265. See UNESCO, supra note 247. 
266. See Boyle et al., supra note 85, art. 14, at 21–22. 
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